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Abstract 
In this paper we provide empirical evidence concerning the nature of loan commitment 
contracts as reflected by individual loan contract parameters in influencing the size of bank 
commitments. Specifically, we consider how the quantitative allocation of credit, the loan 
amount, is affected or altered by changes to other components of the total loan package. By 
doing so we shed some more light on the types of real world trade-offs that credit 
constrained firms might face when approaching banks for funds, using the UK 
governments loan guarantee programme. Our results point at the importance of relationship 
lending in the UK. 
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 1 Introduction 
The limited ability of small firms to gain access to sufficient capital on favourable terms 
has prompted policy-makers throughout the developed and developing world to intervene 
in capital markets (Honohan, 2010; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). Honohan (2010: p. 2) supports the motivation for government involvement by 
stating that, “lack of credit is a binding constraint on enterprise and SME investment, most 
strikingly illustrated by the increased enterprise and very high returns achieved by persons 
endowed or gifted with additional capital sums.” This is supported by empirical evidence 
from Abor and Biekpe (2006), who find that new firms depend more on more formal 
sources of finance, particularly loans, and by implication are more likely to be constrained 
by access to debt issues, or cash-flow problems (Crespi and Scellato, 2010). It is also 
supported by Michaelas et al. (1999), Fraser (2014), Van der Zwan (2016), and Mach 
(2014) who all argue that economic downturns fundamentally change the behaviour of 
banks and their willingness to supply credit to smaller firms and Chatelain (1998) who 
argues that credit rationing acts as a financial brake during recessions. More general 
evidence shows wide regional disparities in access to finance (Xiao and Ritchie, 2009), and 
a lack of provision and use of softer advice to support loan applications (Scott and Irwin, 
2009).  
In this paper we take the theoretical model of Melnik and Plaut (1986) as our starting point 
and empirically test the model’s empirical implications concerning loan commitments 
using a sample of UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS) supported loan 
contracts. A loan commitment contract (termed overdraft in the UK) refers to a 
commitment by a lending bank to make available for drawdown a specified cash amount to 
a firm for a fixed period of time. The firm may draw down this cash, up to the total agreed 
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commitment at any time during the entire duration of the commitment. Importantly, the 
firm only pays interest on the amounts drawn down. This differs from a term loan which is 
drawn down by the firm in full at the beginning of the loan contract and incurs interest 
payments (and capital repayment) until the loan term is complete when the balance is zero. 
Loan commitments are the dominant source of debt financing across the world followed by 
term loans, thus highlighting the key role that banks play in the external financing of 
smaller businesses. Thus the paper’s focus is very specifically upon credit allocation 
(defined as micro rationing by Ghosh et al., 2000) to small firms who would otherwise be 
perfectly rationed in the credit market, and hence more likely to either not start at all or go 
out of business (Montgomery et al., 2005). This contrasts with the more common approach 
adopted in earlier studies which have tended to take the price of loan funds as the 
analytical point of departure (see for example, Goldfeld, 1966; Jaffee, 1971; Slovin and 
Sushka, 1983; King, 1986; Sofianos et al., 1990; Berger and Udell, 1992; Cowling, 2010), 
although the Berger and Udell study also addressed quantity of credit issues. 
For this study we confine our analysis to issues surrounding credit allocation from a 
quantitative perspective. Thus we are seeking to explain how much credit is available to 
small firms, not simply how much it costs. Implicit in the model is that a loan commitment 
contract represents the final outcome of a process of negotiation between borrower and 
lender over the various parameters of the total contract, or at least the ultimate choice made 
by the borrower between an array of potential contracts offered by the lender. In this 
respect we hope to empirically identify two key features of commercial lending. Firstly, we 
consider how different firm and loan characteristics influence the supply of loan funds 
under commitment. Secondly, we consider the nature of any trade-offs between loan 
contract terms. Whilst this study explicitly refers to the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee 
Scheme, the findings have much wider relevance given the existence of similar 
 programmes throughout the EU, the US and Canada and in other countries (see for 
example SOFARIS in France or Burgschaftsbanken in Germany). 
The role of commitment lending has been central to the theoretical development and 
empirical testing of credit rationing theories for at least a decade. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the numerical importance of loan commitments in the US and UK 
markets for debt finance. In the US, for example, Mach and Wolken (2006), using the 2003 
National Survey of Small Business Finances, find that 41.1% of loans were under 
commitment which is less than the 53% reported in Berger and Udell (1992). For the UK, 
Williams and Cowling (2009) give a figure of 37% down from the figure of 43% reported 
in Cowling (2010), and a substantial decrease from the 1980s when around 2/3rds of all 
loan contracts were under commitment. For this study loan commitments have two key 
roles, one which operates at the micro level and one which is a macro issue. On the latter, 
commitments can be used to insulate borrowers from the effects of tight monetary policy. 
This occurs as borrowers are contractually insured against credit rationing in a way that 
non-commitment borrowers are not. 
At the micro level commitment contracts can alter the nature and scope of information 
based problems between borrower and lender. For example, borrowers choosing between a 
different set of potential commitment contracts reveal more information to the bank about 
their type, thus reducing information asymmetries. Yet commitment loans, by their very 
nature as a forward looking contract, mean that there is less information available to the 
lender than is the case when spot contracts are negotiated as and when funds are needed. In 
this case the borrower effectively transfers risk to the lender (Avery and Berger, 1991). 
A body of research which has direct implications vis a vis the use of commitment loans is 
that of relationship lending (see for example, De Bodt et al., 2005, Lummer and 
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McConnell,1989, Petersen and Rajan,1994, Berger and Udell,1995; Berger et al., 2011). 
Here we refer to the process whereby lenders gather information about borrowers 
throughout the course of their banking relationship. This allows lenders to make 
increasingly informed decisions over time about loan contract terms. As to the tangible 
benefits which might derive from relationship lending, perhaps the most obvious are that 
more credit becomes available at lower cost. This can occur through reduced information 
problems or through the greater willingness of lenders to support existing customers in 
periods of temporary financial distress, although Jiminez et al. (2009) find that use of 
collateral is higher for loans made at the local level where relationships are perhaps 
stronger. Avery et al. (1998) find that personal guarantees are widespread on commitment 
loans to small businesses, and Huang (2003) and Bougheas et al. (2006) both show that 
rationing is more severe for small firms in periods of monetary tightness. 
Clearly a loan commitment, as a vehicle for insuring borrowers from credit crunches, is a 
very efficient means of achieving these benefits. Yet there exists the potential for 
relationship lending to act to the detriment of borrowers. In this case loan commitments are 
a contractual mechanism by which banks (lenders) can lock-in new borrowers by initially 
offering them cheap credit (Sharpe, 1990). In addition, the increasingly private information 
available to the lender throughout an extended relationship makes it more difficult for 
borrowers to obtain further credit on comparable terms by switching lenders. Empirically, 
Berger and Udell (1995) found that borrowing costs and collateral requirements on 
commitment loans tend to decline with the length of the banking relationship. This sort of 
evidence offers support for the theory that commitment loans are used as a means of 
protecting favoured customers from unfavourable circumstance, although Niinimäki 
(2009) points out how fluctuating collateral values can increase moral hazard, and Berger 
et al. (2011) find that unlimited liability reduces access to credit. 
 Thus far we have outlined how loan commitments might operate through the credit market 
at the micro level. We now focus on the monetary policy transmission mechanism at the 
macro level. For example, standard money theory suggests that interest rate changes, the 
primary monetary policy instrument, alter consumption patterns by increasing the 
opportunity cost of current consumption over future consumption. Financial market theory, 
by contrast, tends to focus on the role of interest rates in reducing credit allocation, the 
supply of loanable funds (Blinder, 1987). The use of commitment loan contracts should 
obviate the effects of tight monetary policy through the credit channel and in doing so may 
also relieve the downward pressure on real consumption. 
To this extent the empirical point of focus is well grounded in previous literature which has 
often viewed loan contracts as being multi-dimensional in the sense that they represent a 
bundle of terms or parameters over which the principals and agents negotiate (Melnik and 
Plaut, 1986, Chan and Thakor,1987, Martinelli,1997). Yet with the exception of the former 
most studies have singularly focused on the impact of changing various contract 
parameters on loan price. Chan and Thakor, for example, see price and collateral as a pair 
that act in opposing ways, i.e. the more collateral the borrower is willing to supply, the 
cheaper the loan price. 
Given our theoretical point of reference and the nature of the data available to us, the 
explicit focus is on the concept of loan commitment contracts as a bundle of loan terms, 
only one of which is price. With this in mind, the rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
In Section 2 we present a brief discussion of the UK credit market with particular reference 
to the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLGS), the source of our data. Section 3 
develops a simple model drawn from that presented by Melnik and Plaut (1986). The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. We end in Section 5 with 
concluding comments. 
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2 Loan Commitments in the Context of the UK SFLGS 
Historically, the majority of commercial loans in the UK and US were issued under 
commitment, although this has diminished over time. As is the case in the US, a typical 
commitment contract will specify a maximum amount of funds that are available to a 
borrower for a given period of time. For this facility the borrower is charged a loan 
arrangement fee, which is either a fixed percentage of the amount borrowed (as is the case 
in the SFLGS) or alternatively a fixed fee, typically in the region of £100 to £200. In the 
latter case there are clearly economies of scale in borrowing larger amounts. There is 
considerable cross-country variation in arrangement fees too. For example, the French 
(SOFARIS) scheme charges no fee but the German (Burgschaftsbanken) scheme charges 
0.75% commission on the amount guaranteed with a minimum fee of £175. 
For credit that is drawn down, the borrower pays the lender an interest rate which can be 
either variable or fixed. For variable lending the interest rate is linked to the base rate 
(prime rate in the US). For fixed rate lending the interest rate is fixed at the point of 
contract and remains at this level for the contract’s specified duration. In the UK, the use of 
fixed rate loans in the commercial loan market is still in its infancy, despite a long history 
in the UK mortgage market. On loan term, the maximum term available under the SFLGS 
is 10 years, although the typical loan is considerably shorter than this. In the normal course 
of lending, loan contracts will include other parameters such as collateral requirements and 
restrictive covenants. The role of collateral in the case of the SFLGS is crucial in the sense 
that one of the schemes’ key objectives is to support smaller firms with viable lending 
proposals who are debt constrained by a lack of collateralisable assets. In actuality we 
observe that in a substantial number of cases the borrower will have a collateralised loan 
running alongside an SFLGS loan. 
 Thus loan commitment contracts involve negotiation on a number of parameters between 
the lender and borrower. Whilst the firm specific risk premium, the bank margin over base, 
is a key component of the loan contract, it is by no means the only parameter. A further 
key feature of this type of contract is that the individual parameters of the loan contract 
cannot be split and traded. As such the individual parameters can only be considered with 
reference to the other parameters as changing one will have compensating effects on the 
others (see Cowling, 1995, for earlier evidence on the nature of trade-offs between SFLGS 
parameters). We now focus on the loan commitment model that will be subsequently tested 
by empirical analysis of the data. 
3 Modelling the Loan Contract Bundle 
We begin by specifying a loan commitment contract as appropriating the vector B{L*, T, 
m, k, C}. Here L* represents a firm’s maximum credit limit which’s upper bound in the 
case of the SFLGS is £250,000 for established firms and £100,000 for new firms. For 
comparison, the French and German schemes both have substantially larger limits (in 
excess of £520,000). T is the loan duration which’s upper bound under SFLGS rules is set 
at 10 years, and m is the risk premium or bank margin over base. k is the loan arrangement 
fee, which is fixed at 1.5% of the total loan amount (L*), and C is the amount of collateral 
provided as security to the lender. In our framework, where the base rate is exogenously 
determined (set by the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee to ensure inflation 
remains at some pre-specified target level) and contracts take the form of a single 
transaction, we exclude the base rate from our model specification. The risk premium, the 
bank margin, is firm specific in the sense that it represents the lender’s judgement on the 
firm’s likelihood of loan repayment. 
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For each contract the borrower decides the extent of his liability to the bank in each sub-
period of the total loan duration. By implication this must be between zero and the 
maximum loan amount. In each sub-period the borrower repays it +m on Lt (the amount of 
credit that is drawn down), where it is the prevailing base rate. The actual determination of 
Lt is dependent upon prevailing macroeconomic conditions at the time, or at least 
conditions relevant to the firm. Further, we assume that the higher the maximum loan 
amount, L*, the lower the probability that this represents a binding credit constraint. In an 
abstract world in which no borrowers default on their loans the lender’s profit function can 
be expressed as: 
kL* + ∫0 T Lt emt dt    (1) 
In a real world characterised by default, in our sample default is 28%, we can specify the 
probability that a given borrower will repay as π. If we define the state of the world as Φ, 
then we can identify two possible sources of uncertainty for the lender which might result 
in loan default at the point of maximum loan term denoted T where default occurs with 
probability (1-π). This probability then becomes a function of Φ in time periods before T 
and Φ at time T. An example of this might be for a borrower who takes out a loan as the 
economy slipped into a prolonged recession. The cumulative effects of recession might 
take its toll on the firm over a number of time periods, t, as might the effects of recession at 
the point of loan completion, T. 
Regarding default explicitly, the model assumes that in unfavourable states of the world (1-
π) is higher for larger loans, L*, and for borrowers with higher premiums, m, implicitly 
riskier borrowers. This assumption rests on the fact that borrowers with a large L* and 
higher premiums, m, have greater outstanding liabilities at time T. By contrast borrowers 
who pledge collateral have a reduced probability of default, as they are reluctant to forfeit 
 their assets. Default probability is also increasing in T as longer duration loans accumulate 
more interest and there is an increased likelihood that the loan contract term will extend 
into a period of unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances. 
In a formal sense we can write the repayment probability, π, as a function of all the loan 
contract parameters with the exception of those, such as the arrangement fee k, which are 
pre-paid at the point of loan issue. Thus: 
π = π{L*, T, m, C}   (2) 
where π is allowed to vary across individual borrowers. In each case though π is increasing 
in C and decreasing in L*, T and m. In the case of default the case of the SFLGS is slightly 
different from that in the course of normal lending contracts. Here the lender retains the 
collateral pledged by the borrower and receives the government guaranteed percentage of 
the remaining loan amount. This is 85% for existing firm borrowers and 70% for new firm 
borrowers. On absolute collateral levels pledged by third parties, in this case the UK 
treasury, Chen (2006) argues that this can alleviate potential problems of inefficient project 
liquidation associated with high personal (or firm) level guarantees.  
For the lender, the utility gained from lending £1 increases with the proportion of the total 
loan amount that is represented by the loan arrangement fee k. In a similar vein the higher 
the proportion of the loan covered by the borrower’s collateral the greater the utility. A 
higher risk premium, m, increases lender utility and a larger loan amount L* reduces it. 
Thus we can begin to establish the nature of potential trade-offs between the individual 
loan contract terms. For example, more collateral can be traded-off for more credit and/or a 
lower risk premium. Given that the explicit focus of this study is on credit allocation in a 
quantitative sense, the a priori predictions from the model are that a higher allocation of 
credit, L*, will be associated with higher risk premia, m, and more collateral, C. 
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4 Empirical Tests 
From the model presented in Section 3 we assumed that borrowers select from various 
contract bundles containing a number of loan specific parameters. In making their selection 
they implicitly trade-off more of certain parameters for less of others. For example, a 
borrower with substantial assets could trade them off for a reduction in borrowing costs. In 
the real world there are a number of other factors, not considered thus far, which might be 
considered by banks when evaluating creditworthiness of individual borrowers, for 
example legal form, age of firm etc. In a similar vein there are a number of bank specific 
factors which might influence the nature of the contract sets they offer borrowers with 
identical characteristics. 
At the empirical level we are seeking to explain what determined the loan amount specified 
in the commitment contract offered to, and accepted by, the borrower firm. In doing so a 
particular point of interest is on the identification of any trade-offs between the individual 
loan contract parameters. The data we use is derived from the loan contract records of a 
total of 30,744 SFLGS borrowers over the period 2000 to 2005. These loans are spread 
over some 35 banks and financial institutions throughout the UK, although the vast 
majority (of the order of 80%) are issued by the four major clearing banks. Of the total 
loans issued, some 17,946 were issued under commitment. It is this subset of loans that we 
analyse. 
In terms of the data available, we have information on the specific loan contract terms, a 
bank identifier, and some firm specific information, for example age, size and legal form. 
The data covers all loan contracts issued under the auspices of the SFLGS over the 
specified period. The data is collated centrally by the Department for Business Innovation 
 and Skills as the scheme requires that each borrower completes a standard form at the point 
of loan issue. The set of loan commitment contracts is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D Min Max 
Loan Size, L* (£s) 63,996.20 52,242.44 1,063 250,000 
Contract Term, T (months) 77.17 31.43 3 132 
Risk premium, m (%) 3.12 1.46 0.01 31.00 
Collateral [1,0] 0.30 0.45 0 1 
New Firm [1,0] 0.28 0.46 0 1 
Ltd Liability [1,0] 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Variable rate loan [1,0] 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Defaulter [1,0] 0.28 0.44 0 1 
 
From the table we observe that the average loan size is £64,000. The average risk premium 
is only 3.12%, although the range of margins is quite large, varying from virtually risk-free 
to the rather onerous rate of 31% over base.1 Only three in every ten loans have borrower 
collateral attached and the majority are made to firms with limited liability legal status. 
Nearly one in three borrowers are new firms and out of the total of 17,946 loans issued 
28% ended in default. Information on firm size was available for all loans issued and we 
                                                          
1 We cross-referenced the margins data with Bank of England SME data and took a view 
that any reported margins that were below the lower margin spread boundary were 
potentially incorrectly reported and removed them from our analysis. 
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note that the average firm employed 8 workers and had a turnover of £425,224. We can a 
priori predict what the signs on the key contract variables are. These are identified below: 
L* = f {T (-), m (+), C (+), Size (+), Age (+), Legal Status LTD (+), Default (-), Bank (?)} 
We exclude k from our analysis as it is a fixed and pre-specified proportion of all SFLGS 
loans. In addition we allow for non-linearity in firm size effects on the assumption that the 
effect of doubling in size when at the lower end of the firm size distribution might be 
considered a greater risk decrease than doubling the size of a large firm. Further we use the 
two size measures available to us, employment and sales, in otherwise identical model 
specifications. One key innovation is that we have information on which individual loan 
contracts resulted in ex post default (risk), as well as our ex ante measure of risk, the loan 
interest rate, m. Defaulted loans are coded 1 in our default dummy variable and have the 
expected negative sign in that they represent the purest measure of risk. This variable in 
particular is extremely interesting in that it provides information concerning the ability of 
lenders to correctly evaluate borrower risk at the point of issue. This type of variable has 
been adopted in previous empirical work, particularly in insurance contracting (Puelz and 
Snow, 1994, Chiappori and Salanié, 1997, Dionne et al., 1997) to proxy for risk type. In 
the bank contracting literature, Cressy and Toivanen (2001) use loan repayment success to 
proxy for risk type in the presence of adverse selection. Shen (2002) also uses a toxic firm 
(loan) dummy variable in his empirical study of bad loans in bad years. However, in the 
context of the theoretical model we could argue that if the other contract parameters are 
specified in such a way that default is compensated for then this is rational or efficient 
contracting by the lender. Full collateralisation might be a case in point. 
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First, we consider the basic correlations (Table 2). We find that loan amount is most highly 
correlated with loan term (+0.19), new firms (-0.20), and limited companies (+0.20). 
Interest rate margins are very highly correlated with variable rate lending, but in a negative 
way (-0.48). A particularly interesting feature was that our two risk measures, bank interest 
margin (m) which is our ex ante measure, and default, our ex post risk measure, are 
significantly, and positively correlated, but the absolute magnitude of the correlation is low 
at 0.04. 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Loan Size 1.00         
(2) Contract Term 0.19 1.00        
(3) Risk Premium -0.02 -0.04 1.00       
(4) Collateral 0.00 -0.04 0.04 1.00      
(5) New Firm -0.20 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 1.00     
(6) Ltd Firm 0.20 -0.21 0.01 0.03 0.01 1.00    
(7) Variable Rate 0.04 0.05 -0.48 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 1.00   
(8) Defaulter -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.13 -0.04 1.00 
Note: Bold indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
The results of different specifications of the basic model are presented in Table 3. The 
dependent variable in each case is the loan commitment size in £’s. Models were estimated 
by OLS but with robust standard errors. The first point of note in model (1) is that loan size 
is not related to our ex ante risk premiums variable even though we allow for non-linearity 
in the relationship. The non-significance could be due to the lower repayment probability 
associated with a higher m, cancelling out the positive effect on lender utility via higher 
received interest payments. The length of contract, T, was found to act in a positive, and 
significant, way on loan size across all equations. Here an increase of one year (12 months) 
in the contract terms is associated with an increase in the commitment of between £4,000 
  15 
and £4,700, which represents between 6.3% and 7.4% of the average loan size issued. This 
goes against the expected sign but it implies that banks value the customer relationship 
much more than the potential for greater uncertainty associated with longer duration loans. 
The collateral variable was found to be insignificant in all equations. On firm size we note 
that there is a non-linear and concave relationship. Here the loan amount increases sharply 
as firm size increases at the lower end of the distribution, but tails off for very large firms. 
Ignoring the squared term for the moment, a £1,000 increase in turnover increases loan 
amount by between £10 and £40 (Models (3) and (4)). For employment an additional 10 
workers raises loan size by £886 (Model (1)). 
Turning to the default variable, our ex post risk measure, we initially observe that it is 
negative and significant in all equations where it is included. Here a defaulting firm 
receives between £5,500 and £6,200 less loan than a firm who repays. On legal status we 
observe that limited liability firms get substantially larger loans than either partnerships or 
sole traders. The scale of this limited liability effect ranges from £24,000 - £32,000. One 
interpretation is that limited liability firms have greater credibility and legitimacy than 
other legal forms of business and consequently are viewed as less risky by lending 
institutions. 
We also observe that variable rate loans, those dependent upon the prime rate, attract 
higher loan amounts than fixed rate loans. This is consistent with the theoretical model to 
the extent that variable rate borrowers’ pay more in total than fixed rate borrowers and are 
thus rewarded by larger loans. The predictions from our models show that variable rate 
borrowers get loans of the order of £2,900 - £5,500 larger than fixed rate borrowers. There 
is also some evidence of quantity rationing against new firms who, on average, are 
advanced between £16,000 and £21,000 less than existing firms, although in one model 
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(model 4) this significance disappeared.2 Finally we note that there is substantial variation 
across lending institutions. Unfortunately we are not permitted to name them as the 
Department views this as a breach of confidentiality. What we can say is that the estimates 
show that two otherwise identical borrowers each taking out the same type of contract can 
have loan amounts that differ by up to £44,000. This is a very substantial difference and 
highlights the considerable heterogeneity of lenders, even in a highly concentrated banking 
sector such as the UK. 
What remains unexplained are likely to be other factors that banks use to assess risk such 
as the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur, the management team and suchlike. In 
addition we note that in the real world a bank relationship involves more than just one-off 
loan decisions made in splendid isolation. Such concerns may influence any one or all of 
the loan commitment parameters. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we drew inspiration from an earlier model and empirical test of credit 
allocation developed by Melnik and Plaut (1986). The basic thrust of their work was that a 
loan contract has many parameters that are interlinked and can be traded-off against each 
other. It is the preference of the individual borrower that determines which of the various 
competing contract bundles he or she chooses given the lender’s offer set. 
We then proceeded to empirically test the model using a unique dataset for the UK 
comprised of borrowers who were perfectly credit constrained prior to successfully 
applying for SFLGS funds. Where our results proved to be significant we find some 
                                                          
2 An alternative explanation is that, relative to established firms, new firms have lower 
demand for credit. 
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differences with those identified in the US. In particular, only our ex post risk variable was 
significant whereas Melnik and Plaut’s ex ante risk was highly significant in most models. 
Further, their contract duration variable only had weak significance compared to a strong 
and positive effect across all our models, indicating the importance of relationship lending 
in the UK. But we also found strong similarity in our positive firm size effect. We did not 
identify an explicit trade-off between bank risk premia and loan amounts, although the 
results concerning variable rate lending is consistent with higher premia on larger loans.  
Taken as a whole the results are supportive of two basic conclusions. Firstly, for lending 
institutions the desire to facilitate the development of long-term relationships with 
customers is an overriding aim and one that spills over into the loan market. Secondly, this 
also has important implications, and broadly supportive ones, for the role of corrective 
schemes such as the SFLGS in allowing certain types of borrowers’ access to funds and 
hence the potential to build a relationship with a bank. It is likely that, in the absence of 
loan guarantee schemes, entrepreneurs with little wealth would be more likely to face 
binding credit constraints. 
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Table 3: Loan Commitment Equation: Dependent variable = Loan Amount 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)   
 Ex ante Risk + Emp Ex post Risk + Emp Ex post Risk + Sales Ex ante Risk + Sales  
          
 β 
t β t β t β t   
T 389.995 21.510 334.785 27.220 337.481 28.030 394.559 23.200   
m -657.803 -1.160     -437.655 -0.820   
m2 68.090 1.200     52.295 0.980   
Size 88.627 6.340 24.406 5.280 0.010 29.400 0.043 19.430   
Size 2 -0.003 -6.390 -0.001 -5.310 0.000 -29.370 0.000 -3.980   
C -474.249 -0.430 292.917 0.370 404.004 0.520 -241.834 -0.240   
New -19469.250 -17.300 -21139.620 -27.320 -16192.190 -20.810 -1159.100 -0.920   
Ltd 30765.860 21.620 31906.830 30.730 30052.050 29.520 24067.150 17.840   
Variable 2931.426 2.160 5508.659 4.940 5344.862 4.900 3136.746 2.460   
Default 
  -6223.553 -8.010 -5513.951 -7.240     
Constant 10963.720 3.970 16189.690 9.540 12297.320 7.380 -3219.191 -1.220   
 
          
R2 0.14  0.13  0.170  0.24    
F stat 148.45  325.90  445.720  300.34    
N obs 8,480  17,930  17,891  8,469    
 
Note: Bold indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
 
